|
CHAPTER ONE
Background on Electric Industry Competition and Restructuring
1.0 Introduction
Passage of federal Energy Policy
Act in 1992 set the stage for a transformation of the nation's electric
industry from a regulated monopoly to a competitive market system.
The core of that transformation
would expand competition among generating companies at the wholesale level
through greater transmission access and participation of new suppliers. It
would also create competition for customers at the retail level through an
opening of the distribution systems to power marketers. For many of the
nation's electric utilities the shift to competition implies a corporate
and operational restructuring into separate distribution, transmission,
and generation functions.
Following passage of the Energy
Policy Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission established rules to
enhance competition at the wholesale level and encouraged states to
establish laws and rules that would facilitate competition at the retail
level. Twenty-four states have undertaken such action to establish retail
competition. Another 24 states are studying the issue to determine
possible impacts and options. States with high-cost electricity have taken
early and aggressive action in the belief that competition may succeed in
reducing costs and rates where regulation has failed to do so. Low-cost
states, however, have expressed concern that their costs may rise as a
result of establishing competitive retail markets for electric power.
Nebraska has long been recognized to have some of the lowest electric rates in the nation. In 1997 Nebraska was 6th lowest in the nation for commercial consumers; 7 th lowest for industrial consumers; and 9th lowest for residential consumers. Due to the weighting of various customer mixes, Nebraska was 11th lowest for an average of
all customer classes. (See Map M1-1 on page 12 for the average for all
customer classes.)
Nebraska is also recognized as
the only state in which all consumers are served by consumer-owned
municipal systems, public power districts and rural cooperatives whose
core principle is delivering electricity as a non-profit service.
Although one may debate whether
any change is warranted, the state's electric systems are interconnected
with other utilities in the region through regional power grids. the
Mid-Continent Area Power Pool and the Western Systems Coordinating
Council. Changes in federal requirements, changes in the regional markets,
and changes in utilities with whom the Nebraska systems conduct business,
as well as the desire of some customer segments, require that the state
examine and address the transformation taking place.
While expansion of wholesale
markets is underway, Congress has currently left the issue of retail
competition up to the states to determine. Proposed federal legislation
would allow any state to develop its own plan to prepare for competition
in the electric industry. Nebraska has an opportunity to develop a plan to
address its unique situation. As Nebraska citizens and policy-makers
consider a plan for the future of their electric utilities, it is
important to understand the context and key issues concerning deregulation
and restructuring of infrastructure industries.
For the purpose of providing a
broad context, Chapter One examines the background of restructuring of the
electric utility industry; deregulation of other infrastructure industries
in the United States, including impacts on Nebraska; electric utility
industry restructuring in other nations; and proposed changes at the
federal level to restructure the U.S. electric utility industry.
Subsequent chapters provide an
overview of completed and anticipated developments in wholesale and retail
electric competition and possible impacts and alternatives for Nebraska's
consumer-owned electric systems. The result is a proposed framework for
development of Nebraska's plan to address electric utility competition and
restructuring.
1.1
Background on Electric Industry Restructuring
For the last 60 years, the
electric utility industry in the United States has consisted primarily of
vertically integrated electric utilities which include generation,
transmission and distribution functions. Nationally, it is a mixed system
of private investor-owned companies, and federal, state, and local
consumer-owned facilities. In 1995 there were 244 investor-owned private
electric utilities providing power to 75 percent of the nation's
consumers; 931 rural electric cooperatives providing power to 11 percent
of the nation's consumers; and 2,020 public power systems providing power
to nearly 14 percent of the nation's consumers. Although some public power
systems and rural cooperatives own generating plants, most function only
as distribution systems. In addition to these utilities directly supplying
consumers at the retail level, federal power agencies and independent
power producers generate and sell power at the wholesale level.
The nation's power supply and
distribution companies are organized into 26 power supply regions
operating as part of three major grids of transmission lines, one east of
the Rocky Mountains, one to the west, and one in the Texas region. They
are also organized into nine regional electric reliability councils.
Nebraska's electric systems in the eastern two-thirds of the state are
part of the Mid-Continent Area Power Pool (MAPP) which covers a geographic
region including South Dakota, North Dakota, Montana, Minnesota, western
Wisconsin, Iowa and parts of Saskatchewan and Manitoba. Nebraska electric
systems in the western part of the state are members of the Western
Systems Coordinating Council (WSCC).
The organization and structure of
the nation's electric industry that evolved during the 1935-1995 period
resulted from a previous restructuring of the industry prompted by the
federal Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA). The Holding
Company Act broke up 16 major utility holding companies, which had come to
control 75 percent of the nation's power output by the late 1920s. It
addressed financial and market power abuses of the utility holding
companies by creating barriers to limit market power and the potential for
future abuse. This had specific significance for Nebraska. Several of
these holding companies owned subsidiaries in Nebraska which had bought
out more than one-third of the state's municipal electric systems,
prevented the formation of rural electric cooperatives, and also hampered
development and management of irrigation resources. Statewide initiatives
and laws passed in Nebraska in the 1930s, complementary to the federal
Holding Company Act, fostered a movement to buy out these holding company
subsidiaries and structured the consumer-owned electric industry in the
state today.
The state's 121 municipal
electric systems, 31 public power districts and 11 rural electric
cooperatives were organized as city departments, by petition, or by
incorporation, respectively. Local boards of elected or appointed
representatives govern these agencies. The municipal systems are regulated
by the city council or village board (12 have boards appointed by the city
council and mayor). These boards set rates, oversee quality of service,
and make financing and budget decisions. The boards often operate in
coordination with the city or village council. Major policy questions can
be brought to voters as referenda questions in general elections.
Each public power district is
governed by an elected board of directors who serve for a term of six
years, with no limitation on the number of terms an individual may serve.
The boards must have at least five members and no more than 21. Similar to
municipal electric boards, the public power district directors oversee
decisions on budgets, power supply, rates, and other policies. Board
membership is not a full time job. Each board appoints a chief executive
officer to manage the district's affairs as directed by the board.
Rural distribution cooperatives
are governed by similar boards of directors elected by the
member/consumers at annual meetings. Candidates do not appear on the
general election ballot like public power district candidates. Because the
rural distribution cooperatives are organized under laws for non-profit
organizations they are not subject to the same statutory requirements as
municipal and public power district systems.
The state's municipal systems,
public power districts and rural electric cooperatives are further
organized by voluntary coordinating bodies and associations such as the
Nebraska Power Association, the Nebraska Rural Electric Association, and
the Municipal Energy Agency of Nebraska. They also utilize cooperative and
contractual relationships to gain operational efficiencies. At the
wholesale level, these systems participate in a power supply market that
operates as a voluntary contractual arrangement between interconnected
utilities to facilitate reserve-sharing and to market surplus capacity and
energy coordination.
Nebraska's locally-directed
electric systems face potential changes in organization, principles,
operations and governance in order to address expanded wholesale
competition and new retail competition. Cooperative arrangements and
principles of non-discriminatory, non-profit power delivery and local
control utilized by the Nebraska systems are not compatible with the
principles of a competitive market which are focused on service to
selected high-use customers or selected groups of customers and
market-based pricing. Competitive pressures could undermine cooperative
arrangements utilized by Nebraska systems, unless they committed to
methods to preserve those arrangements. Increased competitive pressure to
alter non-profit, cost-of service pricing to market-based pricing could
also raise Nebraska's wholesale and retail power costs.
Market pressures and the
perception of market pressures are already engendering consideration of
certain changes in response to events happening nationally and in the MAPP
and WSCC regions.
1.1.1 Changes in the Electric Utility Industry After the Energy Policy Act of 1992
The transition now going on
nationally and in the MAPP and WSCC regions was set in motion by passage
of federal laws in 1978 and 1992, and subsequent federal regulatory
actions.
Deregulation of the electric
industry began with the passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act in 1978. This established the basis for independent, competitive
companies to enter the power generation business at the wholesale level.
During the 1980s federal regulatory efforts sought to enhance access to
transmission lines for these new generators and to help establish
competitive wholesale markets. In 1992, passage of the Energy Policy Act
(EPAct) mandated broad open access to transmission lines and encouraged
greater competition in generation. The EPAct set the stage for the most
significant change in the electric utility industry since implementation
of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
The Energy Policy Act did not
mandate retail competition and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) was specifically prevented from ordering retail competition.
However, FERC efforts to expand wholesale markets has been accompanied by
encouragement of states to establish competitive retail markets. The first
major step in expanding wholesale markets and setting up retail
competition is developing non-discriminatory transmission access.
In April 1996, FERC issued
landmark orders 888 and 889 to implement open access to jurisdictional
high voltage electric transmission systems. These orders also set in place
the process to develop independent system operator (ISO) organizations and
independent transmission companies (commonly known as Transcos or
Independent Transmission Companies). The central issue is to create
non-discriminatory open access for all suppliers and elimination of the
ability of transmission owners to use the lines and facilities for their
own strategic purposes.
For Nebraska and other states in
the region, events to date can be characterized by efforts to form
regional ISOs and transmission companies, expansion of the wholesale
energy and transmission markets, upward price volatility in new wholesale
markets, major utility mergers and reorganizations and the emergence of
new competitive energy service companies, retail competition pilots, and
limited retail markets opening in several states. In summary, for an
industry that has relied upon joint planning of transmission and
generation and relatively stable planning horizons, the transition to
competition has created general uncertainty concerning the future.
In order to address the broad
long term changes ahead, it is important to understand the key forces
driving electric industry restructuring, experience with deregulation in
other infrastructure industries, and changes proposed at the federal level
and in other states.
1.1.2 Forces Driving Electric Industry Restructuring
Electric industry restructuring
can be attributed to several key factors. It has generally been recognized
that once transmission access began to open up and allow more wholesale
transactions in the early 1990s, large industrial users and competitive
wholesale suppliers in high-cost states pressed for access to develop
competitive contracts at the retail level. Supporting these efforts were
advances in generating plant and transmission technologies, electricity
price disparities between states and regions, and political support for
the philosophy of deregulation.
As competition evolves in the
electricity industry, market forces could create additional new
technologies currently unforeseen as well as marketer packages of combined
energy services (i.e. natural gas and electricity), or combined "wires"
services including telecommunications, Internet, and cable television, or
even more diverse packages including home security and lawn services.
As wholesale markets expand,
there is an expectation that the price of wholesale power will decline
from previous levels in high-cost states and remain stable or slightly
increase in low-cost states as the market prices reflect demand and as
market risk is incorporated into price. However, early experience shows a
high level of volatility in these markets and an increase, rather than a
decrease, in wholesale prices of high-cost states. Recent studies
conducted in low-cost states have indicated the potential for substantial
increases in power prices. Other national studies, which will be discussed
later in this report, indicate conflicting results as to whether
Nebraska's consumers would experience price increases or decreases as a
result of retail competition.
The opportunity for a low-cost
state's generators to sell into the wholesale market can create pressure
on low electric rates, depending upon the extent to which proceeds from
these sales are returned to maintain or reduce current retail electricity
prices. Of special significance and concern will be the extent to which a
low-cost state's generating facilities are used to sell to customers
outside the state of the detriment to electric rates within the state.
Expectations concerning lower
costs from competitive markets are based on the assumption that market
forces can bring about efficiencies and reduce costs better than a
regulated market system.
Comparisons are often made
between efforts to establish competitive retail markets in the electric
industry, and deregulation and competition that is evolving in other
infrastructure industries such as airlines, telecommunications, and
natural gas. The electric industry is often viewed as the last major
infrastructure industry to be deregulated.
The magnitude of the changes
involved in creation of competitive markets and restructuring of electric
companies dwarfs all other deregulation. No other industry approaches the
complexity of issues and the amount of capital in transition. Because of
the differences in each industry, great care must be taken in attempts to
project parallel results.
1.2 Deregulation of Other U.S. Infrastructure Industries and in Other Nations
During the last two decades,
deregulation of the major transportation and utility industries was
brought about in part by the following deregulation initiatives:
- Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
and FERC Orders
- Airline Deregulation Act of
1978
- Motor Carrier Reform Act of
1980
- Staggers Rail Act of 1980
- Telecommunications Act of 1996
and Court Ordered Divestiture
While direct comparisons to the
electric industry are limited, experience in the deregulation of these
industries offers lessons that may prove useful.
The results of deregulation of
other infrastructure industries are mixed at best. As seen in
telecommunications and natural gas, much of the competitive structure
remains to be put in place for small commercial and residential consumers.
There have clearly been changes in structure of the industries, and
technological advances have been fostered, but this must be weighed
against the "winners-and-losers" experience at the local level, and
corporate consolidations that may undermine viable competition.
General findings that may be
applied to the electric industry from the experience in other
infrastructure industries: 1) small commercial and residential consumers
and those in rural areas face questionable benefits from deregulated
markets; 2) it will take time for a competitive system to evolve to serve
all consumers; 3) technological advances and new packages of services may
be anticipated; 4) prices may not decline as anticipated; 5) greater and
not less regulatory oversight may be required; 6) in particular, market
power restrictions and regulatory oversight will be needed to prevent
anti-competitive behavior.
In addition to the U.S.
experience in deregulating and restructuring key infrastructure
industries, such general findings are supported by experience of
deregulation and restructuring the electric industry in other nations that
began in advance of the U.S.
Deregulation and restructuring of
the electricity industry in the U.K. was accompanied by a major extension
of economic regulation.
In general electric industry
restructuring in other nations indicates that:
1) expanded wholesale competition
does not necessarily equate to lower cost power prices, 2) retail
competition does not assure equal access for all customers and broad-based
"customer choice", 3) transitions to competitive markets will require
on-going legislative and regulatory involvement and are likely to take a
decade or more to mature.
1.3 Activity at the Federal Level At the federal level there are a
number of bills before Congress to restructure the electric industry. In
addition to these proposals, regulatory activity at FERC could affect
Nebraska systems. The formation of Independent System Operators or
regional transmission companies and expanded authority for FERC, could
place increased pressures on Nebraska systems to adopt certain practices
or policies related to transmission access and wholesale competition. FERC
Orders 888 and 889, issued in April 1996 to implement the requirements of
the Energy Policy Act of 1992; require all jurisdictional transmission
owners to provide non-discriminatory open access to transmission to all
current and potential users. It is important to note that FERC orders
apply to "public utilities" that are generally defined as private
investor-owned companies under FERC's jurisdiction. Public power and rural
cooperative systems in Nebraska are not currently subject to FERC
jurisdiction. However, because public power and rural cooperative systems
own transmission lines that are interconnected with jurisdictional
utilities and because they are members of regional power pools (such as
MAPP), they are impacted by the FERC orders
FERC's goal is to eliminate the
remaining patchwork of closed and open jurisdictional transmission systems
and ensure that all these systems, including those that already provide
some form of open access, cannot use monopoly power over transmission to
unduly discriminate against others.
As noted earlier, Congress has
initially left the timing and nature of electric industry restructuring up
to the states to decide. States are moving forward on varying schedules
and differing proposals for competition. As of October 1, 1999, 21 states
have passed legislation to establish retail competition. Three states have
established competitive markets by regulatory order, and 24 states and the
District of Columbia, are studying the issue. In addition, 24 low-cost
states, including Nebraska, have petitioned Congress to allow states to
make their own determinations concerning the timing and form that
competition and electric industry restructuring will take.
Both direct and indirect
pressures resulting from federal actions and evolution of the market can
be expected to increase. While federal consensus has not yet emerged, it
is anticipated that after the year 2000 elections, Congress will be much
more likely to act on this issue.
In the meantime, Nebraska has an
opportunity to develop a plan based on its own conditions concerning the
timing and elements of electric competition. The following summaries of
each chapter outline the key points that may help to inform Nebraska's
plan.
CHAPTER TWO: Electric Industry
Restructuring in Other States
This chapter reviews activity to
establish wholesale and retail competition in other states. It looks at
experience in states that have established retail markets and at
preconditions for market and key issues being addressed by other states.
The chapter also examines market transformation that is occurring with a
focus on merger activity of significance to Nebraska. It concludes with a
review of the pressures that may face Nebraska from neighboring states,
regional agencies, and federal agencies.
- All states are facing major
changes in the electric industry, even without state legislation or
rules for competition being passed or promulgated.
- Twenty-one states have enacted
legislation to establish retail competition; three states have issued
comprehensive regulatory orders; twenty-four states and the District of
Columbia are studying restructuring and formation of competitive retail
markets; two states have undertaken little preliminary action to date.
- The states which had opened
markets for retail competition by June 1, 1999 showed opportunities for
large customers, but difficulty in creating market conditions that allow
small commercial and residential customers to be served. The market has
also been characterized by private deal-making and non-transparent
pricing which prevent market forces from functioning effectively.
- Early common problems in the
open-market states indicate certain key issues must be fully addressed
and certain preconditions should be met before undertaking retail
competition aimed at benefiting all consumers.
- New business structures,
alliances and multiple service providers are under consideration or
forming
- Electric utilities in Nebraska and neighboring states will
all engage in an expanded wholesale power supply market, but no
determinations have been made in Iowa, Kansas, South Dakota, Wyoming, or
Colorado to establish retail competition.
- While states are taking varied approaches, common problems
are apparent both in wholesale and retail markets. It is essential that
preconditions be met in structure and market conditions prior to
Nebraska systems making a transition to retail competition. These
conditions include: a fully functioning ISO and mature wholesale market;
business transaction and consumer protection rules; market pricing that
indicates savings on power costs significant enough to offset costs of
the transition; a safety net in place to assure that no consumers suffer
net harm from the transition.
- Major mergers and extensive structural change are occurring
in the industry, even in states which have not passed legislation or
regulatory orders. For Nebraska several major mergers in surrounding
states could affect wholesale markets and increase the pressure to
initiate retail competition
- The broad effect of mergers in the Nebraska region is to
create two large electric utility holding companies in Iowa where there
were originally six, and to create one large electric utility holding
company in Missouri/Kansas where there were originally three utility
companies. Typical concerns that arise from electric utility mergers: 1)
increased market concentration in generation and/or transmission
ownership; 2) significantly increased growth in number of retail
customers under single entity; 3) significantly increased corporate size
of merged entity; 4) "convergence" of various services in new entity.
TABLE 2-1 . Utility Mergers and Acquisitions in North Central U.S.
|
Merger of: |
With |
Date of Merger |
New Entity |
Notes |
Midwest Energy (Iowa Public
Service) |
Iowa Resources (Iowa Power and
Light) |
1990 |
Midwest Resources, Inc. |
Merger of Holding and Operating
Companies |
IE Industries (Iowa Electric Light and
Power) |
Iowa Southern Utilities |
1991 |
IES Industries, Inc. |
Acquisition |
Western Resources (Kansas Power and
Light) |
Kansas Gas and Electric
Company |
1992 |
Western Resources, Inc. |
Acquisition |
Midwest Resources Inc. |
Iowa-Illinois Gas and
Electric |
1995 |
MidAmerican Energy Company,
Inc. |
Merger |
Union Electric Company |
Central Illinois Public Service
Company |
1997 |
Ameren Corporation |
Merger |
WPL Holdings Inc. |
IES Industries and Interstate Power
Company |
1998 |
Alliant, Inc. |
Merger |
CalEnergy Company, Inc. |
MidAmerican Energy Holdings
Co |
1998 (announced and approved by
stockholders) |
MidAmerican Energy |
Purchase/Merger |
WPS Resources Corp. (Wisconsin Public
Service |
Upper Peninsula Energy
Corp. |
1998 |
WPS Resources Corp. |
Acquisition |
Western Resources, Inc. |
Kansas City Power and Light
Co. |
1998 (filed amended
plan) |
Westar |
Merger proposal |
Northern States Power . Transmission Co.
subsidiary |
Alliant Inc. transmission
facilities |
1998 |
Northern States Power . Transmission Co.
subsidiary |
Lease of transmission system
facilities |
MidAmerican Energy |
CBS and Home Real Estate Companies
(Omaha) |
1998 |
|
Acquisition |
Northern States Power |
New Century Energies |
1999 (Approval Pending) |
Xcel Energy |
Merger |
CHAPTER THREE: Retail Competition Customer
Choice and Consumer Protection
Chapter Three addresses
fundamental issues of retail competition, consumer choice and consumer
protections specific to conditions in Nebraska. It examines wholesale
supply pricing and other preconditions for retail competition. It outlines
the interest of Nebraska consumers in "customer choice" and the regulatory
structure and rules needed for consumer education and protection. It also
offers the views and recommendations of the Advisory Group and the Task
Force. In summary, the chapter outlines consumer-related elements that
need to be in place if retail competition is to be established in the
state.
- Conditions in Nebraska differ
significantly from those of other states that are moving to establish
retail competition. a) Retail competition offers an alternative to state
regulation of energy pricing for private utilities; Nebraska systems are
locally-controlled, and deliver electricity as a non-profit service
at-cost. b) Nebraska's wholesale power market delivers electricity to
local electric systems at a cost lower than the surrounding region;
moving to a regional market could cause these power costs to rise, not
decline.
- Surveys of consumers indicate
a certain amount of interest in retail competition in Nebraska.
- The concept of "customer
choice" and the freedom it implies has substantial appeal to consumers,
but due to practical matters of relatively high transaction costs and
low profit margins, "choice" and competitive access for small consumers
remains an unrealized goal in open market states. Such a failure in
Nebraska would affect more than 700,000 of the state's 835,000 metered
electric consumers.
- Nationally, electric, natural
gas, and telecommunications utilities are moving rapidly to transform
themselves into delivery companies that offer customers a range of
services in combination with electric energy.
- Consumers appear to be most
interested at this point in their electric supplier's core business, and
not additional, unrelated services.
- The market can be expected to
move in advance of, and in some cases pre-empt, policy-making. In view
of this fact, a proper structure is more important than behavioral rules
to assure benefits of both wholesale and retail competitive markets.
- For Nebraska, local utility
boards have maintained the role of developing and implementing consumer
protection policies based upon established principles of consumer-owned
systems. Application of these policies may vary among local systems.
- In a competitive retail
market, statewide standards and policies would be needed, including a
uniform "Consumer Bill of Rights."
- Designation and development of
a statewide regulatory body to augment the functions of local government
would be essential for a competitive retail market.
- Participation in retail
competition should not be mandated, but local systems should be able to
opt in through a public process at the local level.
Table 3-1 Nebraska Retail Customers
|
STATE OF NEBRASKA -
RETAIL |
|
Class of Consumers |
No. of Consumers |
% of Consumers |
Energy (MWH) |
% of Sale |
Revenues ($1,000) |
% of Rev. |
|
Residential |
687,214 |
82.2 |
7,564,902 |
37.0 |
$482,306 |
43.5 |
|
Commercial |
105,847 |
12.7 |
6,648,369 |
32.5 |
$339,276 |
30.6 |
|
Industrial |
2,368 |
0.3 |
4,775,113 |
23.4 |
$188,115 |
16.9 |
|
Irrigation |
31,569 |
3.8 |
749,624 |
3.7 |
$61,504 |
5.5 |
|
Other |
8,907 |
1.0 |
692,219 |
3.4 |
$39,049 |
3.5 |
|
TOTAL |
835,905 |
100.0 |
20,430,22727 |
100.0 |
$1,110,250 |
100.0 |
>Source: L.R. 455
Survey
CHAPTER FOUR: Three Models to Address Nebraska
Key Issues and Potential Impacts
This chapter introduces the three
structural models utilized in this study to examine the possible scope of
change and the relative benefits or impacts associated with introducing
retail competition and undertaking restructure of Nebraska's electric
industry. The three models are modified Current Structure, Limited Access,
and Open Access. The chapter examines the distribution, transmission, and
generation functions of each model and the key questions that arise from
each model. It also outlines potential impacts related to each model.
These are discussed in greater depth in later chapters.
- The Current Structure of the
industry is based on 170 entities providing wholesale and retail service
through voluntary coordinating bodies, associations, and contractual
relationships: 121 municipal systems; 31 rural power districts; 15 rural
cooperatives, 1 public power and irrigation district, 1 municipal joint
action agency and 1 federal power agency.
- Potential impacts and changes for the industry can
be assessed by looking at three alternative models: a) a Modified
Current Structure; b) Limited Access for Competition; c) Open Access for
Competition.
- The Modified Current Structure can enhance the
current structure to create greater efficiencies and prepare for
pressures of competition. Wholesale power supply level changes include a
functioning ISO, a Nebraska Power Optimization Center, and a statewide
Nebraska Generation Organization. Retail level functions could remain
largely unchanged, but the current retail structure could face mergers,
alliances, or divestiture.
- The Limited Access Structure could also include the
wholesale level changes in the Modified Current Structure, but would
allow retail competition for a set of customers qualified by certain
characteristics or phasing of the market. Limited Access allows for a
managed approach to competition, but may only be a transitional step to
Open Access.
- The Open Access Structure requires the most
significant change from the Current Structure. The same wholesale level
changes could apply, and at the retail level any customer could
theoretically have access to a competitive supplier. States utilizing an
Open Access form have required divestiture of generating assets to
assure fair competition. Open Access, as well as Limited Access would
create a need for a statewide regulatory system, and would alter the
principles of operation for the Nebraska systems, if they were to engage
in the competitive retail market.
- In
assessing potential changes it is important to understand the
relationships of the Nebraska systems outlined in Chart 4-1.
- Chapter 5 provides detail on considerations of the
Modified Current Structure, Limited Access and Open Access
models.
CHAPTER FIVE: Changes and Impacts on
Industry Structure and Operations
This
chapter examines the impacts of electric industry restructuring and
formation of competitive markets on existing utility structure and
operations in Nebraska. It outlines the key issues and options related to
structure and operations. It provides an assessment of the types of
changes that would be required in Nebraska for variations in the industry
structure and its operations. This chapter addresses a broad range of
restructuring and competition issues related to structure and operations,
and takes up divestiture of generating plants and distribution systems as
one of the possible elements of restructuring. Other studies could focus
on divestiture alone, however, this report addresses it only as one option
in the general context of restructuring and competition. The chapter
closes with a description of Advisory Group positions on key issues and
options and recommendations of the Task Force.
- A
determining factor for the development of any option, will be the extent
to which Nebraska systems work together to achieve efficiencies in
generation, transmission and distribution. If they do not work closely
together, market pressures and attraction of alliances with other
entities could undermine the cooperative relationships and contracts
under which they currently operate.
- The overriding issues that face Nebraska systems
are: a) how best to accommodate expanded competition at the wholesale
level to benefit Nebraska consumers; b) whether extensive changes at the
retail level for competition would produce greater efficiencies, more
reliable service, reduced costs, and adequate protection for consumers;
or minimal changes in the existing structure will achieve the same or
greater benefits.
- Both economic and non-economic criteria need to be
applied to evaluation of options. Economic criteria includes
start-up and on-going costs for new regulation and other functions.
Non-economic criteria includes risk, environmental, workforce, and
equity issues that often translate into long term economic impacts.
- For the wholesale power supply level, the Task
Force recommends methods to retain low cost wholesale power including
examination of a Nebraska Power Otpimization Center, a Nebraska
Generation Organization, and mandatory participation in joint planning
of generation. Additionally, the Task Force recommends on-going
examination of the role of distributed generation and renewable energy
resources.
- At
the Transmission level, the Task Force recommends continued
participation of transmission-owning systems in efforts to form a
regional ISO, and also examination of a Nebraska Transmission
Organization, and regional public power and consumer-owned ISO, as well
as other methods for greater efficiency in Nebraska's transmission
network.
- In
terms of Regulation, the Task Force recommends that initial legislation
be developed that includes the Nebraska Power Review Board as the
initial regulatory body to coordinate work groups and hold hearings
regarding proposed rules, standards, protocols, studies, and other
preparatory work. The Power Review Board should also participate in
national dialogue (i.e. FERC and NARUC) on transmission regulation. The
Task Force also recommends that the role of the ultimate statewide
regulatory body to be authorized in implementation legislation augment
the traditional roles of local boards overseeing delivery of electric
service to consumers.
- At
the Distribution Level, the Task Force recommends modification of the
Current Structure to enhance system operations and to prepare for the
pressures of retail competition. Mergers and alliances should be
voluntary, but incentives and criteria should be developed by the state.
Divestiture should be assessed on a similar case-by-case basis, using an
income-based valuation methodology and criteria established by the
state.
- With specific incentives and criteria in place,
laws and regulations could be changed to allow greater equity and
latitude of business relationships and services by local distribution
systems. This would allow all Nebraska consumers to receive benefits of
multi-service packages that include electricity.
- Provisions need to be made in any transition to
assure stability and security for Nebraska's utility workforce to assure
reliability and safety of the electric delivery systems.
- The Task Force recommends that a transition to
retail competition should be undertaken only when preconditions are in
place, and benefits offset transition and transaction costs. A key
precondition would be a substantial and decisive shift from the low
wholesale power cost advantage Nebraska currently enjoys, which may
continue as indicated in Chart 5-1.
CHART 5-1 WHOLESALE POWER PRICE PROJECTIONS FOR
NEBRASKA AND REGION 1999-2010

CHAPTER SIX: Impacts on the Environment,
Energy Efficiency, and Renewable Energy
Chapter Six provides context for the consideration of
issues related to the environment, energy efficiency and renewable energy.
Specifically, it discusses: the key environmental issues resulting from
electric utility operations; the likely impact of electric utility
restructuring on the economics that drive utility generating plant
decisions; and mechanisms considered in other states to maintain and
advance environmental protection, energy efficiency and renewable energy
development. It includes recommendations on the mechanisms to be
considered for Nebraska.
- Changes to competitive retail market systems could
have impacts on the environment and energy efficiency and renewable
energy
- A
competitive retail market could also have possible environmental impacts
on air emissions, water quality and management of water resources.
- Environmental impacts driven largely by economics
of generation and could be affected by a shift to low-cost generation
and full-throttle operation of plants. Size and flexibility of units,
capital costs, financing costs and federal hydro power policies need to
be considered.
- Several mechanisms for environmental protection
need to be considered: a) Emissions and fuel taxes to address
environmental externalities; b) Portfolio standards; c) Choice for Clean
Energy and Green Pricing; d) Surcharges or Access Charges.
- Care needs to be taken in formulation of
environmental policies to address competitive issues with surrounding
states: a) possible adverse impacts of more stringent
regulation/standards; b) impacts on interstate economic competition.
- Platte River issues need to be addressed including
possibility that value of power generated may no longer be sufficient to
cover total costs of providing environmental and other public benefits.
One possible solution is an increase in fees or new fees for benefits
and services.
- In
a highly competitive market some Demand Side Management (DSM) programs
may decline due to cost, however, price volatility may create greater
interest in certain programs. Specific programs could be expanded as
part of marketing strategy.
- The trend toward an increased number of identified
fixed costs components in utility bills may provide consumers with less
incentive to take energy efficiency actions.
- Legislative solutions rather than individual Local
Distribution Company solutions are needed.
- The Task Force recommends that these items be
considered: a) minimum portfolio standards; b) green pricing to support
choice of clean energy and green energy; c) consumer contribution
programs for renewable energy projects; d) standards should be set to
define green power and green pricing; e) a consumer charge to cover
public benefits programs; f) consumer disclosure (label); g) net
billing/net metering.
- Policies for these programs have been adopted both
in states that have passed legislation to establish retail competition,
as well as states that have not. This is indicated in Table 6-1
below.
Table 6-1 STATE POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT OF
RENEWABLE ENERGY
|
State |
Types of Policies In
Place |
|
|
Renewable Energy Requirement |
Public Benefits Fund |
Net Metering |
Disclosure |
|
Arizona |
|
|
Yes |
|
|
California |
|
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Colorado |
|
|
Yes |
|
|
Connecticut |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Delaware |
|
|
Yes |
|
|
Idaho |
|
|
Yes |
|
|
Illinois |
|
Yes |
Yes |
|
|
Indiana |
|
|
Yes |
|
|
Iowa |
Yes |
|
Yes |
|
|
Maine |
Yes |
|
Yes |
Yes |
|
Maryland |
|
|
Yes |
Yes |
|
Massachusetts |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Minnesota |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
|
Montana |
|
Yes |
Yes |
|
|
Nevada |
Yes |
|
Yes |
Yes |
|
New Hampshire |
|
|
Yes |
Yes |
|
New Jersey |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
New Mexico |
|
Yes |
|
Yes |
|
New York |
|
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
North Dakota |
|
|
Yes |
|
|
North Carolina |
|
|
Yes |
|
|
Ohio |
|
|
Yes |
Yes |
|
Oklahoma |
|
|
Yes |
|
|
Oregon |
|
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Pennsylvania |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
|
Rhode Island |
|
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Texas |
Yes |
|
Yes |
Yes |
|
Vermont |
|
|
Yes |
|
|
Virginia |
|
|
Yes |
|
|
Washington |
|
|
Yes |
|
|
Wisconsin |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
|
Data current as of 10/99 |
Source of survey information: Union of
Concerned Scientists (www.ucsusa.org/energy) |
CHAPTER SEVEN:
Changes and Impacts on Law, Governance, Regulation and
Taxation
Chapter Seven focuses on changes in Nebraska's
framework of law, governance, regulation and taxation related to retail
competition. It contains an examination of the different ownership and
governance constructs for Nebraska consumer-owned systems and electric
utilities operating in other states. It includes a discussion of the state
constitutional provisions and statutes relating to power suppliers in
Nebraska and changes that would be needed if the state's policy-makers
decided to proceed with retail competition and restructuring of the
industry. It also includes an extensive discussion of tax law and methods
to preserve tax revenue streams.
Nebraska's current law, governance, regulation and
taxation provide a framework for consumer-owned systems to operate as
non-profit monopolies. Accommodation of an expanded wholesale power supply
market and transmission reorganization in the region can occur with
relatively few changes. Establishment of retail competition, however,
would require a comprehensive revision of this framework.
- Electricity is provided at retail in Nebraska by
three distinct entities: municipal electric systems, public power
districts, and rural electric cooperatives. While the organizational
control of these entities is locally based, all are subject to the
statutory authority of the Nebraska legislature.
- With the exception of service territory issues and
construction of major generation and transmission facilities, state
regulation has a limited role in Nebraska's electric industry.
- Public power districts and municipal systems are
subject to strict statutory mandates regarding open meetings and
maintenance of public records. Such requirements do not apply to
investor-owned electric utilities.
- In
a competitive retail market, the differences between consumer-owned and
investor-owned electric systems would need to be addressed to prevent
investor-owned utilities from gaining competitive advantages. To avoid
the appearance of conflict of interest, public officials who serve on
elected statewide regulatory bodies would need to be prohibited from
accepting political contributions of any kind from the entities subject
to the jurisdiction of the agency on which they seek to serve or from
the employees or directors of such entities.
- Modification of the Current Structure, including
mergers, divestiture, or establishment of new cooperative or public
power entities, would need to examine governance issues to assure
adequate consumer representation, access and input to decision-making.
Statutory changes should be made to facilitate mergers and
consolidations, conversions of power districts to cooperatives, and to
allow more public/private partnerships. Changes may also be needed to
allow transfer of the generation assets of public power districts and
municipalities to another generation organization and to allow the sale
of power district property to private companies in a manner similar to
that applying to municipal and cooperative systems.
- Public power entities in Nebraska are considered
"non-jurisdictional" pursuant to federal definitions. They are not by
definition "public utilities" subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) although legislation pending in
Congress would expand FERC's authority to cover all transmission-owning
entities. Changes in state statutes may be needed to allow the state's
transmission-owning utilities to join RTOs or turn operation of their
systems to some sort of independent system operator.
- If
an open access competitive model is implemented in Nebraska, the state
will need to enhance the role of a statewide regulatory agency to
oversee and enforce market rules. This agency will need additional staff
and resources to perform its functions. During the interim period, the
Power Review Board should be the lead agency to coordinate development
of necessary rules, standards, protocols, consumer protection, and
follow-on studies.
- Public power districts and many municipal systems
are subject to "Dillon's Rule" . which is a rule of statutory
construction that generally provides that political subdivisions of the
state are functionally limited to those activities expressly specified
in their enabling statutes. An investor-owned electric utility is not
subject to this rule and may engage in any lawful business consistent
with its corporate articles. Statutory changes may be needed to achieve
parity in products and services that can be provided by the state's
power suppliers under the existing structure, at least between municipal
systems, power districts, and chapter 70 cooperatives. In addition, a
constitutional amendment may be needed to give public power districts
the ability to provide economic development assistance on a par with
municipalities and cooperatives.
- Current law generally provides that public power
entities must have retail rates that are, "fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory." Concern has been raised that open access
competitive models would involve differential pricing practices that
would conflict with this requirement.
- Certain advertising efforts by public power
entities are potentially controversial while investor-owned utilities
may spend virtually any sum.
- Electric utilities represent a major source of
revenue to federal, state and local governments. Many of today's tax
laws were enacted under the assumption that electricity would be
provided primarily by utilities operating on a monopoly basis with price
set by cost-of-service rate regulation.
- Competition and nontraditional regulation
ultimately may preclude the simple pass-through to ratepayers of a
utility's tax burden. Consequently, these changes bring pressure upon
regulators, legislative bodies and electric utilities to evaluate tax
costs.
- State laws would need to be revised in a manner
consistent with federal law that preserves existing tax revenues.
- The Task Force recommends that Nebraska adopt tax
revenue-neutral impacts as a minimum policy guideline.
- The Task Force recommends discussions with
neighboring state governments and state government associations to
develop alternatives that avoid interstate conflicts.
- The Task Force recommends facilitated resolution of
the private-use issue via enactment of the principles contained in the
Gorton-Kerrey legislation now pending in the 106th Congress (S.386).
- Nebraska's current law, governance, regulation and
taxation currently provide a framework for consumer-owned systems to
operate as non-profit monopolies at the retail level. Accommodation of
an expanded wholesale power supply market and transmission
reorganization in the region can occur with relatively few changes.
Establishment of retail competition, however, would require a
comprehensive revision of this framework.
Table 7-1 ENTITIES AND RANGE
OF TAX PAYMENTS UNDER THREE MODELS
|
STRUCTURE ELEMENTS |
CURRENT |
LIMITED
ACCESS |
OPEN
ACCESS |
| Market Characteristics |
|
|
|
|
Type of Entity
|
|
- Consumer-owned
- Investor-owned
- Power Marketer
- Power Broker
- Aggregator
- Transmission Company
- Service Company
|
- Consumer-owned
- Investor-owned
- Power Marketer
- Power Broker
- Aggregator
- Transmission Company
- Service Company
|
|
Type of Service |
|
- Bundled/Unbundled
- Supply Competitive
- T&D Regulated
- Metering, Billing &
Collecting
|
- Unbundled
- Supply Competitive
- T&D Regulated
- Metering, Billing &
Collecting
|
| Transfer Payments |
|
|
|
| PILOT (C,S) |
|
|
|
| Revenue Tax (S) |
|
|
|
| Property Tax (S) |
|
|
|
| Distribution System Leases (O) |
|
|
|
| General Fund Transfers (O) |
|
|
|
| Franchise & Contracts (O) |
|
|
|
| Income Taxes (S) |
|
|
|
| Sales & Use Taxes (S) |
|
|
|
| Broad Energy Tax (S) |
|
|
|
| Transaction Tax (S) |
|
|
|
|
Legend: C: Constitution Based O: Ordinance Based S:
Statute Based TBD: To Be
Determined |
|
|
|
|
Location of Service
Suppliers |
|
- Local
- Intrastate
- Interstate
|
- Local
- Intrastate
- Interstate
|
CHAPTER
EIGHT:Cost/Benefit Considerations
Chapter Eight examines issues related to the existing
costs and benefits of the current structure of Nebraska's electric
industry, and the potential costs and benefits for restructuring of the
industry to establish retail competition. While a precise comparison of
costs and benefits is beyond the scope of this study, it is possible to
illustrate the types and the relative magnitude of comparative costs and
benefits to provide perspective for policy determinations.
The
chapter begins with an examination of wholesale power costs and an
illustration of the comparative costs and benefits of Nebraska's current
utility system. It then provides an extensive examination of transition
costs. It is significant to note that while there is a potential for
stranded cost on two generating plants, on a statewide basis Nebraska has
no net stranded cost; a measure of the efficiency of the state's
consumer-owned systems. The chapter also includes discussion of tax
revenues and methods of collection in a system of retail competition. It
concludes with a summary of recommendations.
- Just as Nebraska's framework for law, governance,
regulation and taxation support a monopoly structure of consumer-owned
systems, the economic underpinning of the Nebraska systems is aimed at
non-profit delivery of electricity. While a range of benefits that
include local control, consumer equity, stability in pricing and costs,
and integration with local planning may be considered among the benefits
of consumer-owned systems, the bottom line is the price of service
delivery.
- Nebraska's electric systems currently provide among
the lowest electric rates in the nation.
As
discussed in Chapter 3, the state's comparative position in terms of
electric prices remained the same from 1995 though 1997. The average
retail price for Nebraska's commercial consumers was the 6th lowest in the nation (5.46 cents/kilowatt
hour); industrial consumers were the 7th
lowest (3.61 cents/kilowatt hour); residential consumers were the 9th lowest (6.38 cents per kilowatt hour).
- Proponents of competitive retail markets reason
that competition can bring about cost reductions and innovation in
technology and services. While this reasoning may apply effectively to
high-cost states, it does not address Nebraska's current low-cost
situation.
- The policy conclusion that may be drawn from an
initial cost/benefit illustration is that retail competition cannot
assure savings for the majority of Nebraska consumers until a
substantial and decisive shift has occurred in the relative wholesale
power costs of Nebraska and the region.
- As
recommended in Chapter 5, efforts should be undertaken by the Nebraska
systems to maintain low wholesale power costs. Current and anticipated
wholesale power costs compared to those of the region should be
monitored on a regular basis. If efforts to maintain low wholesale power
costs fail and cost differentials are evident for an extended period of
time, resulting in necessary offsets and potential benefits from retail
competition, implementation of retail competition might be undertaken.
If retail competition is to be implemented, detailed cost/benefit
analyses weighing both economic and non-economic criteria would need to
be assessed to allow a local system determination of whether or not to
participate.
- The cost/benefit or "threshold" analyses would need
to be conducted with an examination of all transition and transaction
costs. This requires understanding of the methods of valuation and
recovery of transition costs and tax revenues in a manner that would
protect Nebraska. Transition costs are comprised of stranded costs,
start-up costs and on-going costs.
- There is a potential for stranded costs on
Nebraska's two nuclear generating units, as well as certain
fossil-fueled and hydro facilities. If stranded costs are calculated on
a system-wide basis, the benefits of lower cost generation will help to
offset higher cost generation.
- Time is an important factor in mitigating stranded
costs
- In
order to honor the debt obligations of Nebraska's consumer-owned
electric utilities, any stranded costs on nuclear facilities should be
recovered through the end of the plant's current operating license.
- Transmission assets associated with stranded
generation assets should have stranded cost recovery to the extent those
assets cannot be re-utilized elsewhere in the transmission and delivery
network.
- Purchased power contracts existing at the effective
date of retail choice legislation in Nebraska should be honored for the
life of the contract.
- The costs of any stranded fuel and/or fuel
transportation contracts should be handled in the same manner as the
associated generation. Start-up and on-going costs are incremental to
current costs and should be recovered from consumers in a choice
environment.
- The primary policy principle for Nebraska would
need to be assured, equitable gains for all consumers, and
revenue-neutral or net-neutral impacts from the costs of a transition.
This principle would need to be applied to the range of potential
impacts that may include wholesale power costs, impact on Nebraska
utility revenue, tax impacts on local and state government and other
related areas.
- Nebraska should use a bottom-up, ex ante (before
the fact) administrative approach to initially quantify and collect
stranded costs. Actual stranded costs should be based on the bottom-up,
ex post (after the fact) administrative approach using actual
competitive market conditions and a true-up mechanism to reconcile the
amounts previously collected under the ex ante estimate.
- Nebraska's utilities should mitigate stranded costs
to the extent possible before retail competition begins.
- Certain existing benefits will be stranded as a
result of retail choice. These benefits will have to be recovered
through user or access fees.
- Stranded costs should be analyzed on a
system-by-system basis and considered for unit-by-unit analysis if other
states are implementing such cost recovery. This would involve a
quantitative study, which would include estimates of market price of
energy, the date when retail competition would begin, discount rates and
numerous other factors. The Task Force recommends that such a
quantitative study be conducted under the auspices of the Nebraska
Legislature and Nebraska Power Review Board as part of follow-on
studies.
- Stranded costs, start-up costs, and on-going costs
should be recovered from all consumers in a retail competition
environment.
- Transition cost recovery should be made with
non-bypassable access or user fees as appropriate.
- Tax policy problems are especially difficult for
local governments, which have relied heavily on tax revenues from
electric utilities located within their jurisdictions, because these
governments have only limited sources of other revenue available to
them. It is possible that targeted state aid may be the only effective
means of assisting certain local governments with especially severe
exposure to tax revenue losses.
- The general consensus is that state laws would need
to be revised to preserve existing tax revenues while not giving any
competitive advantage to any group of electric energy providers.
- Nebraska's general tax policy should result in
revenue neutral impacts to taxing entities in a retail choice
environment.
- An
estimate of total costs for transition to retail choice in Nebraska
should be made and compared to experience of other states to determine
potential cost/benefit benchmarks to be utilized for threshold analyses.
Table 8-4 SUMMARY OF STATE TRANSITION COST
PROVISIONS
|
State |
Transition Cost
Feature |
|
Alabama |
Allows reasonable stranded cost recovery
through exit fees. For public utilities that are not under PSC
jurisdiction, special state courts would review contracts and
stranded investment claims. In all cases, utilities could seek 100 %
recovery for losses subject to some mitigation
rules. |
|
Arizona |
ACC's deregulation plan allows for stranded
cost recovery using exit fees and mandates using mitigation
measures; full recovery of stranded costs is possible but not
assured. The bill permits stranded cost recovery via a surcharge on
distribution service, to be collected through
12/31/04. |
|
California |
AB 360 allows utilities to issue $7.3
billion in bonds (securitization) to pay off stranded investments.
The CPUC voted that certain onsite generation serving new or
incremental load, that does not require use of a utility's
transmission or distribution system, can be exempt from the stranded
cost recovery competition transition charge. |
|
Connecticut |
To recover stranded costs, utilities must
separate their transmission and distribution business and sell their
non-nuclear generation by ½000 and interests in nuclear generation
by 1/2004. Utilities will be allowed to sell bonds to cover stranded
costs (securitization) up to the 10% rate reduction. The plan would
allow full recovery of stranded investment costs through a universal
charge on customer bills. |
|
Delaware |
PSC final report recommends that utilities
have an opportunity to recover stranded costs. The PSC is to
determine the magnitude of reasonable stranded costs for each
utility. |
|
Illinois |
HB 362 allows for recovery of stranded costs
based on a formula for lost revenue approach to determine the amount
of transition costs which utilities can recover from customers
during the change from a regulated to a competitive environment.
IOUs are allowed to collect transition costs through December 31,
2006. They will be allowed to petition the Illinois Commerce
Commission to extend this period to December 31, 2008, based on
financial integrity, ability to provide service, impact on
competition and the IOU's prudence |
|
Maine |
LD 1804 allows recovery of stranded costs
after reasonable mitigation efforts, but deferred detailed decisions
to the 1998 legislative session. The law requires investor owned
utilities to sell their generation assets and become wires companies
by March 1, 2000. |
|
Maryland |
PSC order states that utilities be allowed
recovery of stranded costs. Utilities must file plans for stranded
cost recovery by 3/98. The selling off of generating assets, or
divestiture, is not required nor prohibited. Also, the PSC may
approve securitization to mitigate transition costs |
|
Massachusetts |
Legislation allows full recovery of stranded
costs over a 10-year transition period |
|
Michigan |
Proposed PSC plan would allow full recovery
of stranded costs using exit fees through 2007. Stranded cost
recovery would feature a periodic true-up process to ensure
fairness |
|
Minnesota |
10/97: PUC
report proposed exit fees to pay percentage of stranded
costs. |
|
Mississippi |
11/97: Report
recommends PSC have discretion in recovery of stranded costs, on a
utility-by-utility basis, through a wires charge. Exit fees and
securitization were deemed anti-competitive and would not be
used. |
|
Montana |
SB 390 allows recovery of stranded costs
through nonbypassable customer transition charges. It also allows
for securitization for financing certain transition costs.
|
|
Nevada |
The PUC is authorized in AB 366 to determine
recoverable stranded costs and may impose a procedure for the direct
and unavoidable recovery of allowable stranded costs from
ratepayers. However, stranded cost recovery is not
guaranteed. |
|
New Hampshire |
HB 1392 states that utilities should be
allowed to recover net unmitigated stranded costs, and are obligated
to take reasonable measures to mitigate their stranded costs.
Nonbypassable charges to consumers is recommended as the recovery
mechanism (entry and exit fees are not preferred). The PUC Final
Plan discusses stranded cost recovery through divestiture of
generation assets and contracts and securitization of debts.
|
|
New Jersey |
.8/98: In a ruling on PSE&G's
restructuring plan, an ALJ has opined that PSE&G should recover
from ratepayers most of its stranded costs and would have to cut
rates by 10-12 %. Another ALJ issued an initial decision on Atlantic
City Electric Co.'s stranded costs and unbundling filings agreeing
that stranded cost estimates are acceptable and should be recovered.
Legislative and BPU approval are needed to implement utility
restructuring plans. Utilities would be entitled to recover all
non-mitigatable stranded costs over an 8-year period, including
nuclear decommissioning costs. Total stranded costs for the state's
four IOUs are estimated at $7 billion |
|
New York |
In the PUC order, it states that the PUC
will determine each utility's allowable recovery of stranded costs.
Utilities are expected to use creative means to reduce the amount of
stranded costs prior to consideration. Utilities will include
stranded cost recovery plans in their restructuring filings with the
PUC. |
|
Ohio |
12/97: Stranded costs were addressed in the
report issued by the co-chairs of the Legislative Joint Committee on
Electric Deregulation. The plan allow for recovery of stranded costs
using nonbypassable wires charges. Utilities would be allowed during
the 5-year transition period beginning 1/2000 and ending 12/2004 to
receive "transition revenues" or stranded costs under certain
conditions, but likely expect less than 100% of
recovery. |
|
Oklahoma |
4/97: Under SB 500, each entity must propose
a recovery plan for stranded costs. Transition charges can be
collected over a 3- to 7-year period and must not cause the total
price for electric power to exceed the cost per kWh paid by
consumers when the law was enacted during the transition
period |
|
Pennsylvania |
HB 1509 allows stranded cost recovery
through CTC's; however, the detailed decisions and amount of
recoverable costs are left to the PUC. The legislation expects
utilities to use reasonable mitigation measures, and securitization
is allowed but not required. |
|
Rhode Island |
Stranded costs recovery is allowed through a
customer transition charge of 2.8 cents per kilowatt-hour from 7/97
through 12/2000, and at rates subsequently set by the PUC through
2009. At that time, utilities must sell off 15 percent of their
facilities to determine a market value in order to readjust the
stranded cost transition charge. |
|
South Carolina |
In the proposed implementation plan
submitted by the PSC, recovery of reasonable, verifiable stranded
costs is allowed. Utilities would submit recovery plans for approval
by the PSC. |
|
Texas |
5/98: The PUC's revisions to their plan for
deregulation would allow securitization of stranded assets,
estimated to be $4.5 billion if retail competition happens in 2001.
Deferring full competition one more year would lessen stranded costs
to $3.3 billion, and delaying competition until 2003 would set
stranded costs at approximately $2.3 billion. |
|
|
Chart includes information from retail
competition reports from EIA and
NRECA |
CHAPTER NINE:Public Process and Timing
Considerations
Chapter Nine summarizes recommendations contained in
preceding chapters and offers a planning framework for Nebraska. It
reviews the public policy issues that have been raised and options for
addressing those issues. It outlines the public process utilized in other
states and offers recommendations on public process for Nebraska. The
chapter describes "condition-certain" framework as an alternative to
"date-certain" plans that have presented problems in other states. The
"condition-certain" framework does not mandate retail competition, but
prepares for state and local implementation of retail competition if
preconditions are in place and benefits of a competitive retail market are
assured. The "condition-certain" framework is recommended to be developed
through two pieces of legislation: 1) Initial Legislation that would
establish necessary planning authority and resources and prepare rules,
standards and protocols; 2) Implementation Legislation that would
establish a structure for retail competition once preconditions have been
met and functional rules and structure are prepared. In recognizing the
significance of local control, each municipal system, public power
district, or rural electric cooperative would have the opportunity to opt
into the competitive retail market through its own public
process.
- In
view of the fact that technology, market conditions, and policy will
continue to evolve, and that direct or indirect pressures for retail
competition may result from federal actions, the Task Force has
recommended that Nebraska's public policy framework be developed first
around a priority to maintain low wholesale power costs (which are the
cornerstone of low retail costs); second, to enhance the operation of
the Nebraska systems; and third, to prepare for retail competition on a
conditional basis. This approach provides both flexibility and security
for Nebraska consumers.
- Other states have undertaken efforts with a
"date-certain" approach. This has resulted in the competitive market
opening prior to functioning ISOs being in place, prior to adequate
transaction rules being in place, and prior to market pricing at levels
at which all consumers might benefit. The result has been the formation
of niche markets for large customers, while all consumers must pay the
costs of the transition. Disaggregation of local loads through niche
markets could delay the opportunity for all consumers to participate.
- The recommended condition-certain policy framework
allows Nebraska to address its own unique conditions. It does not
mandate retail competition, but provides a step-by-step public process
to assess and adopt retail competition should that market form offer
assured benefits and protections for all Nebraska consumers.
- The "condition-certain" framework requires that a
definitive and sustained shift in regional wholesale market prices have
taken place to provide an offset to transition and transaction costs for
Nebraska consumers. It also requires several market and structural
preconditions:
- Regional ISO/Transco in place;
- Viable Wholesale Market in place;
- Retail Rates Unbundled;
- Statewide Regulatory Agency in place as well as
rules for certification of suppliers, rules and electronic business
systems for transactions, consumer protection, consumer education, green
power standards, public benefits and standards, determinations on
methodologies for stranded cost quantification and recovery, rules for
access pricing;
- Legislative provisions and processes for
revenue-neutral state and local tax impacts;
- Follow-on studies completed (statewide Generation
Organization or Power Optimization Center, Transmission Efficiencies,
Threshold Benefits Study)
- Opt-In by Local Systems.
- While timing of the Initial Legislation is at the
discretion of the Unicameral, consideration should be given to the
opportunity that currently exists prior to a possible federal mandate,
and in view of the competitive markets forming for other "wires" and
energy-related services in the state. Consideration may also be given to
the possibility that early action could assist with modification and
enhancement of the current structure of the industry and assure that
Nebraskans continue to enjoy low-cost power resources.
CHART 9-1 STEPS FOR CONDITION-CERTAIN
PHASING |